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Abstract 
This paper presents an experiment designed to test the resilience of several user 
verification systems based on face recognition technology against simple identity 
spoofing methods, such as trying to gain access to the system by using mobile 
camera shots of the users, their ID cards, or social media photos of them that are 
available online. We also aim at identifying the compression threshold above which a 
photo can be used to gain access to the system. Four major user verification tools 
were tested: Keyemon and Luxand Blink on Windows and Android Face Unlock and 
FaceLock on Android. The results show all tested systems to be vulnerable to even 
very crude attacks, indicating that the technology is not ready yet for adoption in 
applications where security rather than user convenience is the main concern.  
1 Introduction 
Biometrics based user verification systems rely on the extraction of some human biological 
characteristics and their statistical analysis to verify the identity of a person. It is a 
relatively new technology, competing against more traditional methods such as pins and 
passwords. Apart from enhancing security, biometric methods aim at improving user 
experience, as there is no need for the user to memorise passwords, which could easily be 
forgotten or guessed. [2] [6]. 
Biometric methods are classified into categories. Physiological biometric methods 
are based on human body part measurements and prominent examples include fingerprint, 
face and iris recognition. Behavioural biometric methods are based on human’s action 
measurements and prominent examples include gesture, key stroking, gaits and signature 
recognition. [2] [1]. 
Among the various physiological biometric methods, face recognition has 
recently received attention from both industry and academia [17]. The developed 
techniques vary in sophistication, as well as in hardware and software requirements, 
ranging from systems based on 3D face scans, to systems based on video and systems that 
can work with a single still image [9]. Enhancing the security of face recognition systems 
is a major challenge since a secure system should be able to withstand a variety of attacks, 
ranging from systematic algorithmic attacks to attacks based on theft of data. 
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In this paper, we present an experiment designed to test the resilience of face 
recognition systems against theft of data attacks. The first part of the experiment uses still 
face images collected in different ways and from various sources, i.e., instant still images 
taken during the experiment by a smartphone camera; ID card photos; images found 
through Google Image searches and images on social media platforms such as Facebook 
and WhatsApp. In the second part of the experiment we resize some of the still images that 
were successfully used to gain access to the system and we find the minimum resolution 
required for such an attack.  
2 Background 
2.1 Face Recognition  
Holistic methods for face recognition from still images use the whole face region 
the input of the face recognition algorithm. Eigenfaces, based on Principal Component 
Analysis is the best known example of such methods. The basic algorithm was proposed 
by Sirovich and Kirby [12] and used for face classification by Turk and Pentland [15] [16]. 
The eigenfaces are the eigenvectors with the lowest eigenvalues of the covariance matrix 
of a high dimensional vector space of face image. They are used as the basis of a lower 
dimension vector space of face images. The reduction in the dimension allows for an 
efficient solution to the face classification problem.  
In feature based methods for face recognition from still images, local features 
such as the eyes, the curve of the eyebrows, nose, mouth, shape of the lips and chin, are 
ﬁrst extracted and their locations and local statistics (geometric and/or appearance) are fed 
into a structural classiﬁer [17]. Hybrid methods use a mix of the two previous methods, 
local features and the whole face region, to recognize a face [17].  
Techniques for face recognition from video may be based on still image face 
recognition methods, or on multimodal methods, combining for example video and audio, 
or spatiotemporal methods, analysing for example the trajectory of face features [17].  
2.2 Attacks on Face Recognition Systems 
In [5], attacks on biometric security systems are classified in to two categories. Direct 
attacks are based on theft of biometric data and are carried out against the sensor using 
synthetic traits, such as printed iris images or gummy ﬁngers. Indirect attacks are carried 
out against some of the algorithmic modules of the system.  
An indirect attack based on the hill-climbing algorithm and Bayesian statistics is 
proposed in [3][4]. This attacking technique adapts a global distribution computed from a 
set of all users to the local specificities of the client being attacked and Gelby et al [4] 
reports success rates of over 85% in by-passing the system. Such indirect attack are more 
interesting than direct attacks from a theoretical point of view, however their applicability 
is currently limited by their unrealistic assumption that the system is leaking information to 
the attacker in the form of, for example, face matching scores.  
2.3  Liveness Tests 
Liveness tests use common video or some other form of input such as infrared camera and 
aim at distinguishing between those objects that are alive and those that are not. In [11] 
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three different liveness detection solutions where proposed: (a) liveness detection by using 
a challenge and response method such as eye-blinking (b) by analysing face texture on 
high quality images, and (c) by combining two or more biometrics for example speech and 
face recognition together. 
A liveness detection test against photo spoofing was proposed in [8] based on the analysis 
of spontaneous eye blinking behaviour. Another liveness detection test against photo 
spoofing was proposed in [13], using the differences in the reflective properties between a 
real human face and a photograph of it to discriminate between them.  
2.3.1 KeyLemon 
KeyLemon is a biometric authentication solution based on face and speaker recognition. It 
offers a non-password login to Windows using face recognition on a standard webcam and 
it can also be used for login to web based systems such as Facebook and Twitter. 
KeyLemon claims that its latest face recognition algorithms enhance security by using 3D 
depth sense cameras to combine depth, near-infrared and colour information [18]. Here, we 
run the freely available version of the system on a common laptop hardware configuration 
which did not support such features.   
2.3.2 Luxand Blink 
Luxand Blink is one of the most popular user verification systems used as a convenient 
alternative to passwords. It supports quick non-password login on different operating 
systems, e.g. Windows, Mac OS, linux, iOS and Android. Luxand Blink’s algorithm 
processes the coordinates of 40 facial feature points such as mouth corners, nose tip, eyes, 
eye corners and eyebrows [19].  
2.3.3 Android Face UnLock 
It was first released for the Android 4.0 "Ice Cream Sandwich" for unlocking Android 
mobile phones. Afterwards, an enhanced version was offered on Android 4.1 “Jelly Bean” 
with a new liveness test option embedded, which checks if the person in front of the 
camera is blinking making sure they are alive [20]. Being a non-standard feature, here we 
did not enable this liveness test.   
2.3.4 FaceLock for Apps 
FaceLock for Apps is an alternative face recognition tool for locking either an android 
phone or some of its applications. It is a very popular system, having with a 4/5 star rating 
based on the feedback from more than 10,000 users on google play store [21].  
3 Experimental set-up   
3.1 General Setup 
Two main operating systems were tested in the experiment: Windows 8.1 and Google 
Android 4.4.2. A laptop with Windows 8.1, Intel Core i3 CPU @ 1.90 GHz, GB RAM, 64-
bit Operating System and a Front HD webcam was used to test the KeyLemon and Luxand 
OMAR L., IVRISSIMTZIS I.: RESILIENCE OF FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS  4 
 
Blink systems. A Samsung Galaxy S4 mobile running Android 4.4.2 with a 2MP front 
camera was used to test the Android built-in Face Unlock and the FaceLock for Apps.   
A Samsung Galaxy S4 13 MP rear camera was used to take images of the 
participant at size 2322 x 4128 pixels (9:16). Images were taken from different distances: 
one at short distance (50 cm) where the face is 15% of the full image, one at intermediate 
distance (100 cm) where the face is 3% of the full image, and one at far distance (150 cm) 
where the face is 0.8% if the full image. 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 1: Instant photos of a participant taken by a Samsung Galaxy S4 Rear 13 MP 
camera from different distances: (a) Camera Distance: 50 cm, (b) Camera Distance: 100 
cm, (c) Camera Distance: 150 cm. 
The experiment took place in Amman, Jordan in an indoor environment under 
stable, good illumination conditions. It was a preliminary experiment, aiming at 
establishing the general level of resilience of the most commonly used face recognition 
systems, rather than understanding the specific vulnerabilities of each one of them. As it 
was a simple, black box experiment with binary outcomes, and as we did not aim at that 
stage to identify and explain any sources variance in the collected data, we opted for a 
small number of participants. However, that means that we were not able to run 
meaningful statistical tests on the results and in particular, we were not able to do any 
comparisons between the four systems we tested.  
3.2 Systems Setup 
The recommended default levels of security were chosen for all tested systems. In 
particular, the KeyLemon security level, which ultimately is a trade-off between 
convenience of use and security, was set at medium recognition accuracy. In Luxand 
Blink, the high convenience mode was set, while the medium security level was chosen for 
the Facelock for Apps system. The Android Face Unlock does not have any parameters to 
be set up.  
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3.3 The experiment  
Prior to the experiment each participant was asked to sign a consent form. The form 
contained a brief about the experiment and a reassurance that there were no direct risks to 
them by participating to the study. The duration of the experiment was about one hour per 
participant and it was separated in to four sessions. A sample video of an experiment is 
provided as a supplementary material.  
In the first session, the participants were asked to register with the four systems 
and test their registration. In the second session, the participants were involved in a 
photoshoot session in which three frontal face images of them from distances of 50cm, 
100cm and 150cm and then the participants tried to gain access to the system using these 
images displayed on the smartphone’s camera. In the third session, the participants were 
asked to try to gain access to the systems using the photo of their ID card. Finally, the 
participants were asked to find three face-front photos of them published on the 
internet/social media and these photos, displayed on the smartphone’s camera were again 
used to try to gain access to the systems. After the end of the four sessions, we compressed 
the participant’s photo that was taken in the second session from distance 50cm and tried 
to gain access to the system until the maximum compression ration still allowing access to 
the system was found.  
4 Results 
4.1 Gaining access to the system during the experimental sessions  
The following table shows the results of each experimental session with each participant.   
Instant Photos by the mobile at various distances 
Instant Photo by the mobile from a close distance (approx. 50 cm) was successful 
in gaining access to the following tools: (Yes/No) 
Tool E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average 
KeyLemon Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% Yes 
Luxand Blink Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% Yes 
Face Unlock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% Yes 
FaceLock for Apps Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100% Yes 
 
Instant Photo by the mobile from a close distance (approx. 100 cm) was successful 
in gaining access to the following tools: (Yes/No) 
 
Tool E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average 
KeyLemon No No No No No 0% Yes 
Luxand Blink No No No No No 0% Yes 
Face Unlock No No No No No 0% Yes 
FaceLock for Apps No No No No No 0% Yes 
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Instant Photo by the mobile from a close distance (approx. 150 cm) was successful 
in gaining access to the following tools: (Yes/No) 
 
Tool E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average 
KeyLemon No No No No No 0% Yes 
Luxand Blink No No No No No 0% Yes 
Face Unlock No No No No No 0% Yes 
FaceLock for Apps No No No No No 0% Yes 
 
 
ID Photo 
 
ID photo was successful in gaining access to the following tools: (Yes/No) 
Tool E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average 
KeyLemon No No Yes Yes No 40% Yes 
Luxand Blink No No No Yes No 20% Yes 
Face Unlock No Yes Yes Yes No 60% Yes 
FaceLock for Apps No No No Yes No 20% Yes 
 
Photos on Internet/Social Media 
Photos on Internet/Social Media were successful in gaining access to the following 
tools: (Number of successful images out of 3) 
Tool E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average 
KeyLemon 1 1 2 2 1 46.67% Yes 
Luxand Blink 0 1 1 2 1 33.33% Yes 
Face Unlock 1 0 1 2 1 33.33% Yes 
FaceLock for Apps 0 0 0 2 1 20.00% Yes 
 
 
The participants were able to gain access to all systems using a smartphone shot taken 
from a distance of 50cm, while frontal images taken from distances of 100cm and 150cm 
were not able to gain access to any of our tested systems. However, as the compression 
results in section 4.2 indicate the participant can easily gain access using longer distance 
photos, after zooming into the face and cropping the image.  
Getting access to the systems using ID photos was partially successful. Android 
Face Unlock had the highest by-pass rate with 3/5, followed by keyLemon with 2/5 and 
then Luxand Blink and FaceLock for Apps with 1/5. Photos on the Internet and/or social 
media were also partially successful in gaining access to the tested systems. KeyLemon 
had a successful by-pass rate of 7/15, followed by Luxand Blink and Android Face Unlock 
with 5/15 and FaceLock for Apps with 3/15.   
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4.2 Compression results 
The following table shows the highest compression rate of the photos that were taken at a 
distance of 50cm so that access to the system was still possible. The original photo size is 
2322 x 4128 (9:16) and the face is 15% of the whole image. All photos are encoded in 
JPEG and the percentages in the table correspond to the ratio of the filesize of the 
compressed image to the filesize of the original.  
 
Face Recognition System E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Average 
KeyLemon 2% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 
Luxand Blink 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 
Face Unlock 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
FaceLock for Apps 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
  We notice that even highly compressed images can be used to gain access to the 
tested systems. That suggests that the failure in gaining access with the long range images 
(100cm and 150cm) was most probably due to particular system settings requiring the 
recognised face to be closer to the camera, rather than the lack of information in the long 
range images. To test this hypothesis, the images taken from the 150cm distance were 
cropped around the face, compressed as 50 kb JPEG files, and finally resized by an x2 
zoom. In all five cases, these cropped, compressed and zoomed-in images were 
successfully used in gaining access to all five systems.  
5 Conclusion and future work  
We tested four user verification systems based on face recognition against basic, direct 
malicious attacks. We found all of them to be vulnerable even against the crudest of 
attacks, such as using highly compressed still images taken with smartphone cameras, or 
using still images that can be found in social media. We believe that part of the high 
success rate of the attacks is due to the developers of the systems prioritising user 
convenience over security, at least on the default configuration of their product. However, 
the question on whether face recognition, at least by its own, is suitable for user 
verification can also be raised. Indeed, face recognition seems to rely on data which are 
personal in nature but, nevertheless, are often already in the public domain or can be easily 
stolen. 
In the future we plan to work on developing stronger liveness tests and in 
particular, liveness tests that will not require non-standard hardware configuration such as 
the illuminated IR sensor required by Windows Hello.  
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